The Presidential Political Business Cycle of 1972 by Keller, Robert R. & May, Ann Mari
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
College of Business Faculty Publications Business, College of 
June 1984 
The Presidential Political Business Cycle of 1972 
Robert R. Keller 
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
Ann Mari May 
University of Nebraska - Lincoln, amay1@UNL.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cbafacpub 
 Part of the Business Commons 
Keller, Robert R. and May, Ann Mari, "The Presidential Political Business Cycle of 1972" (1984). College of 
Business Faculty Publications. 25. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cbafacpub/25 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Business, College of at DigitalCommons@University of 
Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in College of Business Faculty Publications by an authorized 
administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
The Presidential Political Business 
Cycle of 1972 
Previous studies of the political business cycle have examined time series data to 
determine whether a pattern of pre-election boom and post-election slump exists. 
The studies do not investigate the behavior and mechanisms by which a politician 
may effectuate a political business cycle. We focus on one time period, 1969 to 
1972, and conclude that President Nixon's personality and operating environment 
explain why he manipulated the economy for political gain. The mechanisms he 
utilized to improve macroeconomic conditions before the 1972 election include 
monetary policy, fiscal policy, and wage-price controls. 
T HE public choice literature on political business cycles argues that self-interested politicians manipulate the economy for political gain. 
The literature supposes that a pattern emerges within an incumbent 
party's term in office where there is "relative austerity in early years" 
and a "potlatch right before elections."' The hypothesis is tested by 
examining time series data over many decades to determine whether 
macroeconomic conditions improve before the election and deteriorate 
after the election. The orthodox literature has found substantial, but not 
conclusive, evidence to support the existence of the political business 
cycle.* 
The orthodox view is underdeveloped because it is narrowly focused 
on testing for the existence of pre-election booms and post-election 
slumps. The problem is that it does not "examine whether the govern- 
ment tries to manipulate the economy to achieve pre-electoral boom and 
post-electoral contraction but whether economic conditions actually do 
correspond to this   at tern."^ Thus, the public choice literature uses a 
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method that emphasizes prediction and correlation at the expense of 
explanation and c a ~ s a t i o n . ~  
Our research is motivated by the failure of most previous studies to 
provide a detailed analysis of the role of the president in the political 
business cycle. We argue that the personality and operating environ- 
ment of the president determine whether he will manipulate the econo- 
my for political gain. The years 1969 to 1972 were chosen because 
several studies intimate that Richard Nixon effectuated a political 
business cycle.' 
THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Public choice models of the political business cycle in the United 
States posit a national decision maker, the president, and assume that 
he is rational, self-interested, and inclined to use macroeconomic 
policies to maximize his or his party's plurality in the upcoming 
e l e ~ t i o n . ~  We assume that the president's personality and operating 
environment determine whether he will implement macroeconomic 
policies to manipulate the economy for political gain. The existence of a 
political business cycle reflects, in part, particular motives manifested 
in the president's behavior. As James Barber emphasizes, the presi- 
dent's personality, especially character, is an enduring orientation that 
contributes to the shaping of his world view and style.' For example, 
Barber's "active-negative" personality type closely conforms to the 
behavioral assumptions of a self-interested, vote-maximizing politician. 
The active-negative is a man for whom " 'principles' are more impor- 
tant as rationalizations justifying behavior than guides for c h o i ~ e . " ~  The 
active-negative has an aggressive approach to problems and a need to 
manipulate and control outcomes. 
The president's decision to manipulate the economy for political gain 
is influenced by the operating environment, which includes the impor- 
tance of the election, the president's motivation and the perceived 
outcome of the election, the probability of detection, and the perceived 
importance of macroeconomic performance. According to Tufte, elec- 
tion years can be ordered from maximum to minimum electoral impor- 
Mark Blaug, The Methodology of Economics (Cambridge, 1980), pp. 1-9. 
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tance in the following manner: on-year, incumbent president seeking 
reelection; mid-term, congressional elections; on-year, incumbent pres- 
ident not seeking reelection; and odd-numbered years.9 Tufte says: 
"There are surely special incentives to the administration in those on- 
years when the incumbent president seeks reelection; his direct person- 
al interest in political survival coincides with what must be a particularly 
tempting opportunity to hit the economic ac~elerator ." '~  If a self- 
interested president perceives that he will lose an election or that his 
vote share will be too small, then he may attempt to manipulate the 
economy for political gain. We assume that the president's perception 
of the election outcome is obtained by data from public opinion polls on 
economic issues and policies, and the president's popularity. The 
president's decision to manipulate the economy is constrained by the 
ideology of his opposition. For example, if the opposition is more liberal 
than the incumbent, criticism for excessive spending will be less likely. 
Finally, the president must be convinced that favorable or improving 
economic conditions will have a positive impact on his reelection 
prospects. 
The conceptual framework is represented by iso-vote (vote share) 
curves and Phillips curves." The iso-vote curves are concave with 
respect to the origin and in the same space as the conventional Phillips 
curve. The president's vote share increases with lower inflation or 
lower unemployment. The state of the economy is represented by a 
point on a short-run Phillips curve. If the president wants to increase his 
vote share then he may implement policies that cause a movement along 
the Phillips curve, an inward shift of the Phillips curve, or an outward 
shift of the iso-vote curves. 
The political business cycle in the years 1969 to 1972 reflects Nixon's 
ideology, personality, operating environment, and macroeconomic poli- 
cies. 
The President's Behavior and Operating Environment 
According to Barber, Nixon was self-interested, his ideology and 
principles were flexible, and his stance toward the political environment 
was aggressive.I2 He believed that macroeconomic variables were 
important in determining election outcomes. He blamed the economy 
for Republican losses in 1954 and 1958, and he was forever convinced 
Tufte, Political Control of the Economy, p. 23. 
' O  Ibid. 
" For a similar approach, refer to Kevin J .  Maloney and Michael L. Smirlock, "Business Cycles 
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that he lost the 1960 election because of the recessionary state of the 
economy.I3 Nixon's concern about economic issues persisted through 
time. The White House tapes reveal that he continued to react "hyper- 
politically to economic  issue^."'^ Finally, Nixon was challenged within 
his own party by a liberal candidate, Paul McCloskey, and by liberal 
candidates of the opposing party-first, Muskie; later, McGovern. 
Thus, it was unlikely that these liberal candidates would accuse Nixon 
of excessively expanding the economy. 
The Mechanisms of  Manipulation 
It is commonly asserted that a president will implement contraction- 
ary policies after an election to reduce inflation and inflationary 
expectations, setting the stage for expansion before the next election. 
We contend that the contractionary policies implemented after the 1968 
election were consistent with the ideology of a conservative Republican 
president and do not reflect political manipulation. Inflation was viewed 
as a serious problem, and a good Republican president could be 
expected to implement contractionary policies. Dwight Eisenhower 
said: "I think Dick's going to be a one-term President. I think he's really 
going to fight inflation, and that will kill him p~litically."'~ 
In response to the contractionary monetary and fiscal policies of 1969 
and 1970 the unemployment rate rose more than expected and inflation 
proved to be an intractable problem. Nixon faced a nightmare of 
recession and inflation. He told Republican leaders early in 1970 that if 
he could not bring the unemployment rate down below 5.5 percent, the 
Republicans would suffer losses in the mid-term elections.I6 He was 
right. Nixon's concerns were amplified by public opinion polls that 
showed that the poor state of the economy was causing a decline in his 
popularity." The Gallup opinion poll showed Nixon's approval rating 
declining to 49 percent in April 1971.18 The Harris poll indicated that 
Muskie, the top Democratic rival at that time, was expanding his lead 
over Nixon until it reached a 47 percent to 39 percent margin in April 
1971.19 
Although the Fed and its monetary policy is ostensibly independent 
from the president and politics, Sherman Maisel, a former governor of 
the Federal Reserve Board, has remarked that the executive branch 
'' Richard M. Nixon, Six Crises (New York, 1968), pp. 333-34. 
l 4  Leonard Silk, "Tapes' Insight on Nixon: They Indicate His Economic Thinking is Heavily 
Weighted by Political Factors," New York Times, Aug. 7, 1974, p. 47. 
l 5  Rowland Evans, Jr., and Robert D. Novak, Nixon in the Whire House (New York. 1971). p. 
178. 
l 6  Theodore White, The Making of the President, 1972 (New York, 19731, p. 62. 
I' Michael Wheeler, Lies, Damn Lies, and Starisrics: The Manipulation of  Public Opinion in 
America (New York, 1976). pp. 1 1-12. 
White, The Making of  the President, 1972, p. 59. 
l 9  Ibid. 
Presidential Political Business Cycle 269 
exerts a powerful influence over the Fed.20 The chairman of the Board 
of Governors wields the most power within the internal structure of the 
Fed.21 A close alliance between the president and the chairman may 
imply an even stronger influence by the executive branch over the Fed. 
Nixon clearly viewed monetary policy as an integral part of his 
economic policies. John Ehrlichman notes that "Nixon was determined 
to control the Fed while maintaining the image of its independence from 
all politicians, including himself."22 Nixon, himself, said to Burns, "I 
know there's a myth of the autonomous Fed . . . and when you go up for 
confirmation some Senator may ask you about your friendship with the 
President. Appearances are going to be important, so you can call 
Ehrlichman to get messages to me, and he'll call 
It is quite clear that Nixon desperately wanted the Fed to implement 
expansionary policies to reduce unemployment. Nixon's motivation for 
urging an expansionary monetary policy was political. There is reason 
to believe that the Fed was either pressured politically or politically 
motivated to expand the money supply because Nixon appointed Burns 
as chairman of the Fed, Nixon and Burns were long-time associates, 
Nixon frequently demanded that Burns expand the money supply, and 
Burns understood the political implications of high ~ n e m p l o y m e n t . ~ ~  
Although the Fed's motives are certainly debatable, the Fed's policy 
was expansive, some say much too expansive, from 1970 to 1972.~' The 
quarterly growth in the money supply averaged slightly more than 7 
percent per year from the second quarter of 1970 to the end of 1972.26 
From Blinder's estimates the expansion of the money supply above its 
trend rate of growth added approximately $51 billion (1958 dollars) to 
real GNP in the year before the election.27 
Turning to Nixon's use of fiscal policy for political gain, it is 
important to distinguish between the aggregated and disaggregated 
effects of policy. Fiscal policy has an impact on national aggregates such 
as disposable income, spending, and prod~ct ion .~ '  It also has disaggre- 
gated impacts because policies can be used to target spending or taxes 
to particular groups in various regions of the country. 
'O Sherman Maisel, Managing the Dollar (New York, 1973), pp. 108-13. 
2' Ibid. Another insider states: "The discussion will associate monetary policy with Arthur 
Burns, because for all intents and purposes monetary policy was Burns." James L. Pierce, "The 
Political Economy of Arthur Burns," Journal of Finance, 34 (May 1979). 485. 
22 John Ehrlichman, Witness to Power (New York, 1982), p. 244. 
" Ibid., p. 248. 
24 Ehrlichman notes that "Burns was every bit as much a politician as he was an economist." In 
Ehrlichman, Witness to Power, p. 244. 
25 Pierce, "The Political Economy," p. 495. 
26 Alan Blinder, Economic Policy and the Great Stagflation (New York, 1979). p. 33. 
'' Ibid., p. 34. 
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Tufte is convinced that the fiscal expansion was a reflection of 
political m ~ t i v a t i o n . ~ ~  Blinder, although more cautious, is at least 
"tempted" to blame the fiscal expansion on the proximity of the 
election.30 The aggregate impact of fiscal expansion between mid-1971 
and the end of 1972 was "the highest in the entire 1959-1973 p e r i ~ d . " ~ '  
The effect of expansionary fiscal policy of 1971 and 1972 was to add 
$63.6 billion (1958 dollars) to real GNP and to increase the growth rate 
of GNP from 4.7 percent to 7.3 percent in the four quarters before the 
election.32 
There is more direct evidence of Nixon relying on the disaggregated 
impact of fiscal policy for political purposes. An appropriate starting 
point is the White House's "Responsiveness Program." The program in 
general made departments and agencies of the federal government 
responsive to Nixon's reelection needs. More specifically, it used 
government resources in the form of personnel, loans, grants, contracts, 
appointments, and brochures to target swing voters such as blacks, 
Hispanics, and the elderly in key states.33 The same strategy is evident 
in a number of government spending and tax programs. Nixon was 
aware of target voters in key states who could swing the election in his 
favor and he used social security benefits, veteran benefits, and grants- 
in-aid to state and local governments to influence voters.34 
In August 1971, wage-price controls were implemented by a conserv- 
ative president historically opposed to any form of controls. Nixon's 
opposition to wage-price controls was largely based on ideology and 
bitter memories of his days in the Office of Price Administration. 
Nevertheless, Nixon imposed controls for the following reasons. First, 
the problem of inflation was intractable: it averaged nearly 4% percent 
per year in the first half of 1971. Second, public opinion polls indicated 
that voters considered inflation to be a serious problem.35 Third, the 
public was in favor of controls. In November 1970, 65 percent of those 
polled favored the government setting wage-price controls.36 In June 
1971, Gallup public opinion poll data showed that 50 percent favored an 
outright freeze on wages and prices while 39 percent opposed it.37 
There is evidence indicating that wage-price controls shifted the 
Phillips curve inward. Blinder estimates that controls reduced inflation, 
29 Tufte, Political Control of the Economy, pp. 45-55. 
30 Blinder, Economic Policy, p. 32. 
" Ibid., p. 145. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Refer to: Presidential Campaign Activities of 1972, Watergate and Related Activities: Use of 
Incumbency-Responsiveness Program (Washington, D.C., 1974), Books 18 and 19. 
34 Tufte, Political Control of the Economy. 
35 Wheeler, Lies, p. 1 1. Wheeler talks about the impact that Sindlinger and his poll had on the 
White House. Also see Gallup Opinion Index, July 1971, Report No.  73, p. 17. 
Blinder, Economic Policy, p. 1 11. 
" Gallup Opinion Index, Aug. 1971, Report No.  74, p. 6.  
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increased output, and reduced unemployment from the time they were 
imposed to well past the election.38 Moreover, the public's reaction to 
Nixon's new policies was very positive, which may imply an outward 
shift of the president's vote share curves. One week after the imposition 
of controls, the Gallup Poll indicated that 73 percent had a favorable 
reaction, 16 percent had an unfavorable reaction, and 11 percent had no 
reaction to Nixon's announced policies of August 15, 1971.39 
CONCLUSION 
Nixon's manipulation of the economy resulted from a particular 
constellation of factors. First, Nixon's personality closely conforms to 
the behavioral assumptions of the public choice literature on the 
political business cycle. Nixon appears to be the epitome of the self- 
interested, pragmatic, politically astute, active president who would be 
most likely to manipulate the economy for political gain. He also had a 
chameleon-like quality with respect to rationalizing economic policies. 
In 1969 he subscribed to monetarism and gradualism, in January 1971 he 
proclaimed himself a Keynesian in economics, and by mid-1971, with 
the enactment of wage-price controls, he could be labeled a post- 
Keynesian. Further, he was extremely sensitive to the importance of 
macroeconomic variables affecting election outcomes. And, his operat- 
ing environment provided few constraints and ample opportunity for 
effectuating a political business cycle. 
In contrast to previous studies, we believe the contraction phase of 
the political business cycle reflects ideological concerns and that it is 
only the expansion phase that demonstrates political manipulation. The 
means by which Nixon manipulated the economy include monetary 
policy, fiscal policy, and wage-price controls. In the expansion phase, 
we place great emphasis on monetary policy and wage-price controls. 
The evidence is fully consistent with studies that conclude that "mone- 
tary policy has responded to the political goals of specific  president^."^' 
The failure of the literature to examine wage-price controls as a policy 
option is a serious oversight-it is the one policy unambiguously 
implemented by the President, and it represents a consummate attempt 
to manipulate the inflation and unemployment trade-off for political 
gain. 
38 Blinder, Economic Policy, p. 27. 
39 Gallup Public Opinion Index, Sept. 1971, Report NO. 75, p. 3. 
40 Maloney and Smirlock, "Business Cycles," p. 389. 
